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Abstract:
Using data from the GSOEP, we analyze the impact of parents’ education („family
background“) on wages and on returns to education. We show that returns to education are
heterogeneous with family background accounting for part of this heterogeneity. While the
level of wages is higher for individuals from families with higher education, estimated returns
to education are higher for individuals from families with lower education levels. However, a
simple regression analysis suffers from serious endogeneity problems. The construction of a
sibling sample allows us to perform a family fixed-effect estimation in order to control for
unobserved characteristics that are shared by family members. Our results suggest that the
conventional estimates overstate the returns to education. Moreover, family background
accounts for a large part of the variation in wages in the sibling sample.
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1I. Introduction
In the 1960s substantial changes took place in the German educational system. The reforms
aimed at an equalization of education opportunities in all social classes and a decrease in the
impact of family background on children’s education. One consequence was the abandonment
of school tuition fees as well as the attempt to equalize school quality allover the country. An
interesting question is now: Does family background still play an important role in the
determination of children’s education and wages in Germany?
In this paper we try to answer this question by examining the role of family background in the
human capital production function, i.e. its influence on wages as well as on returns to
education. In the analysis we use a simple quantity measure of education that, however, also
captures some important differences in school quality in Germany, as will be explained below.
We do not consider the effect of school quality explicitly.
While this area of research has been very active in the United States in recent years, empirical
work in Germany has focussed on questions of industry-specific wage structure, wage
dispersion, inequality and wage stickiness (Abraham and Houseman 1995, Fitzenberger et al.
1995, Nickell and Bell 1996, Steiner and Wagner 1996). An earlier paper by Licht and Steiner
(1991) addresses the problems of individual heterogeneity in the estimation of human capital
earnings functions. Licht and Steiner try to control for unobserved heterogeneity using panel
data. In order to identify the returns to education they rely on changes in education over time.
Unfortunately this procedure is likely to pick up measurement error, and moreover, is treating
persons with uncompleted education histories as if the transitory education status were
optimal.
In order to reduce the bias in the estimation of returns to education we (i) introduce family
background variables as additional controls, (ii) allow for heterogeneous returns to education,
and (iii) construct a sibling sample from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and use
a fixed effects estimator in order to control for unobserved family-specific heterogeneity. This
potentially reduces the bias in the estimation of returns to education.2
There are two remaining problems that we do not solve in this paper. First, the fixed-effect
estimation does not eliminate idiosyncratic differences among the siblings. This induces an
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2upward bias into our estimates of returns to education. Second, we do not tackle the problem
of measurement error in the education variable. This measurement error might lead to an
attenuation bias in the estimates that might offset the above-mentioned bias at least partially.3
In the future we will try to find a solution to the latter problem, while the former problem is
probably going to remain unsolved.
Our results can be summarized as follows: In the full sample family background appears to
play an important role in the determination of wages. Moreover, returns to education seem to
be heterogeneous with family background being an important determinant of this
heterogeneity. Persons from less educated families tend to have lower wages, but higher
returns. However, the estimates of returns to education are very likely to be biased upwards
because of an endogeneity bias. This problem is tackled in the sibling analysis. In the OLS
regressions using the sibling sample the effect of family background is weaker than in the full-
sample regressions and returns to education appear to be homogeneous. Most strikingly, the
fixed-effects estimates of returns to education are much smaller than the ones from the OLS
analysis, with the coefficient of education becoming insignificant. Moreover, family
background accounts for a large part of the variation in wages.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, we derive the econometric model that is the
basis of our analysis. In the next section, we discuss specification issues and suggest solutions
to the endogeneity problem. In section IV the data set, the variables, and the samples are
described. Section V proceeds with presenting and interpreting the result. First we estimate
the earnings function based on the full sample and control for heterogeneity in the level of
wages by using family background variables. Then we also include interactions of education
with other variables. Finally, we present estimates of the earnings function based on the
sibling sample. Section VI concludes.
                                                
3
 However, we believe that measurement error is less of a problem when comparing education across
siblings than when comparing education for a given person over time.
3II. Empirical Model
The research on returns to education is based on the work by Becker (1967) and Mincer
(1974). In the traditional specification, returns to education are estimated as follows:
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where yi is average lifetime income, Si is years of completed education, Ei is experience, and ε
i is a statistical residual. This function that has been introduced by Mincer (1974) is known as
the human capital earnings function. It has been the basis of practically all research on returns
to education. Recently, economists have begun to extend the simple model to capture
additional aspects of returns to education. The framework used in this paper is due to Card
(1995, 1998)4. It differs from the traditional approach in that it allows for heterogeneous
returns to education.
The underlying assumption of most models on human capital formation is that agents
maximize their life-time utility that depends on the average level of earnings over the
lifecycle, denoted by y(S), and the disutility from education, h(S). This is specified as follows:
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Linearity in log earnings implies that the optimal education choice does not depend on factors
that raise earnings proportionally for all levels of education. h(Si) is increasing and convex in
Si.
The first-order condition of this maximization problem sets the marginal benefits of education
equal to its marginal costs:
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Individual heterogeneity is introduced into this model by allowing marginal benefits and
marginal costs to vary across individuals. Marginal benefits are assumed to be linear and
decreasing in Si where the intercept is individual-specific:
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 This section follows closely the presentation in Card (1998).
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By assumption, marginal costs are also linear in Si and increasing. Heterogeneity enters again
through the intercept term:
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The optimal level of education derived from the first-order condition (2) is:
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At the optimum, the marginal return to education of individual i is:
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It is easily derived that returns to education will differ across individuals unless one of the
following two conditions is satisfied:
1. marginal benefits are constant and equal for all i (i.e. )01 == kandbbi  or
2. marginal costs are constant and equal for all i (i.e. ).02 == kandrri
By integrating equation 4, we can derive an econometric model that is very similar to the basic
Mincer equation:
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The important differences to Mincer’s model are the individual-specific intercept and slope
terms that turn the model into a random-coefficient model. The equation can be written in the
form of deviations from means in the following way:
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where 0aa ii −= α  with mean 0.
The basic specification in our empirical work is a modified version of equation 9:
iiiiiiiii XEESSXSy εδγγβββα +++++++= 2212321)log( (10)
5where Si is years of education, Ei is working experience, and Xi are other controls that will be
described below. The interaction terms allow for heterogeneous slope coefficients. They
contain only part of the control variables that enter directly.
III. Specification issues
The problems of estimating equation 10 are obvious: From equation 6 we know that the
optimal choice of education depends on bi and ri. This leads to two potential endogeneity
problems:
1. First, the individual effect ai that represents unobserved ability might be correlated with bi
and ri and thus observed education. This is the well-known ability bias (Griliches, 1977).
2. Second, )( bbi −  might be correlated with observed education (again through bi and ri).
This leads to a self-selection bias because people with higher returns to education might
tend to acquire more education.
Both effects lead to an upward-biased estimate of returns to education (Card 1998).
Another important problem is the existence of reporting errors, both in wages and education.
While the measurement error in wages only affects the estimation of the intercept, the error in
reported education is more serious and might lead to an attenuation bias of the estimates of
returns to education. Such a downward-bias would work in the opposite direction of the
endogeneity bias described above and might offset those effects at least partially. Here we are
concentrating on the possible solutions to the endogeneity problem. The problem of
measurement error is not addressed here.5
In this paper we focus on family background as one possibility of mitigating the endogeneity
problem. Factors subsumed under the notion „family background“ are for example parents’
education, wealth, and family size as well as the existence of a complete or incomplete family.
One approach to reduce the bias in estimating returns to education is to add further control
variables that might capture part of the unobserved components in the error term in equation
9. These controls should also enter in form of interaction terms with education to allow for
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 The bias from measurement error might be substantial (see e.g. Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). For this
reason we clearly have to find a solution to this problem in the future.
6heterogeneous slope coefficients. The higher the correlation between the added variables and
the unobserved components, the lower will be the remaining endogeneity bias. Obvious
candidates for such control variables are family background characteristics (Fi) that most
likely capture part of the unobserved ability, e.g. through genetics. An interaction term
between education and family background can capture the effect of family background on
returns to education. Then, the estimated equation looks as follows:
iiiiiiiiiiii SFFXEESSXSy εµµδγγβββα +++++++++= 212212321)log( (11)
As Card (1998) has shown, adding family background as a control can potentially reduce the
bias relatively to OLS, but it will not make it disappear completely, unless all unobserved
ability components are captured by family background.
Another solution to the problem would be the estimation of equation 9 by an instrumental
variable approach. An appropriate instrument generally has to satisfy two conditions:
1. It has to be strongly correlated with the „contaminated“ variable, i.e. education in our case,
2. it must not be directly correlated with the dependent variable (i.e. wages), which means that
it has to be orthogonal to the unobserved ability components of the error term in the wage
equation (strict exogeneity).
Instruments based on institutional factors, like minimum school leaving age, are particularly
useful because the exogeneity assumption is justifiable for that kind of instruments. It is a
well-established stylized fact that there is a strong positive correlation between the amount of
education obtained by parents and their children. This correlation has been used to justify the
use of parents’ education as an instrument. Even if family background has no independent
effect on children’s earnings, it is not clear, however, whether family background is a good
instrument for children’s education. In most cases, the estimate of the returns to education is
still very likely to be upward-biased (Card, 1998). The bias of the IV-estimate is presumably
bigger than the simple OLS estimate, which in turn is very likely to be bigger than the OLS
estimate when family background is added as a control variable. The existence of
measurement error in education reinforces the ordering of the estimates mentioned above
(Card, 1998). Moreover, the conditions for IV estimation are much stronger with
heterogeneous returns to education than in the usual applications of IV estimation (Card,
1998). Because of the very restricted reliability of IV estimates using family background as
instruments we do not perform an instrumental variable estimation here.
7The use of siblings data is a third way to overcome the endogeneity problem. It is based on the
idea, that at least part of the unobserved heterogeneity is common to members of the same
family. The difference in unobserved ability as well as its importance in the determination of
education should be significantly lower within than between families. This „family fixed
effect“ can be „differenced out“. This reduces the endogeneity bias relatively to the usual
cross-sectional estimator. It has to be noticed, however, that differencing the data may
exacerbate the problem of measurement error, since a large part of the true signal is
„differenced out“.
In differenced form, the estimated equation of the fixed-effects regression looks as follows:
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where the indices i and j denote two siblings and h denotes the household that the siblings
belong to. υ is the new error term. Actually we did not estimate this specification in
differenced form. Instead, we include a “family fixed effect“ to allow for more than two
siblings in one family (which increases efficiency). We also tested whether a random-effects
specification might be more adequate.
IV. Description of Data and Variables
In this section, we describe the features of the data used in our analysis. The data are drawn
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal study of private households
in Germany. We use two different samples: first, a full sample, and second, a sub-sample of
siblings.
1. The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
The structure of the GSOEP is very similar to the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) (see Wagner et al. 1993 for a more detailed description). The GSOEP was started in
1984 in West Germany with 5,921 households, 12,290 interviewed persons, and more than
2,000 children under age 17 (GSOEP West). In 1996, 4,445 households with 8,606
interviewed persons were left in the sample. In 1990 another 2,179 households containing
4,453 persons from East Germany were added to the panel (GSOEP East). Moreover, two
samples of German immigrants were added in 1994 and 1995. Our analysis is based on the
8West German sample, since the education system and the incentives to participate in
schooling were very different in East Germany.
The interviewing procedure of the GSOEP is as follows: All household members who are at
least 17 years old participate in the interviews. Children below age 17 also belong to the
sample and are interviewed as soon as they reach the age of 17. The GSOEP keeps track of all
persons who were a member of a sample household at some point in time. When a person of
an “original“ household leaves a household and forms or enters a new household, this new
household and all of its members are introduced into the sample. The GSOEP has been
particularly successful in this respect. We exploit this feature of the GSOEP to construct a
sibling sample in addition to the full sample consisting of all persons in the 13th wave of the
GSOEP (1996).
The identification number of the biological mother was used to identify siblings. Thus, all
persons in the sample who have the same mother are treated as siblings. Over time many of
the children of a household reach age 17 and eventually enter the labor force. Now that the
GSOEP has existed for 13 years an analysis based on siblings has become feasible with
sample sizes that are reasonably large. There remain some problems with the sibling sample
that are going to be discussed in detail below. We use all siblings contained in the data set and
not just sibling pairs with exactly two siblings. Thus, the sibling sample can be viewed as an
unbalanced panel.
We exclude persons who did not report a positive wage.6 Since apprentices earn a reduced
salary in Germany while they receive formal training and training on the job, we also have to
exclude those from the working sample. Moreover, we exclude persons aged 57 and over
since early retirement often starts at age 57. By excluding persons in the retirement age we
avoid a bias that may arise if retirement decisions depend on wages.7
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 This may introduce a selection bias. We do not deal with this problem here.
7
 This age restriction is not binding for the sibling sample.
92. Variable Description
The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of wage per hour (LOGWAGE)
constructed from monthly gross income and the time actually worked per month.8 Education
(DEGREE) was constructed from data on the individuals’ education degrees. Each degree
enters with the number of years necessary for obtaining the degree and not with the time
actually spent in an educational institution. We departed from that procedure in the case of
vocational training (e.g. apprenticeships) where about half of the time is spent on the job and
not in school. Thus, an apprenticeship, for example, was counted as one and a half years in the
variable DEGREE instead of three years.
The data does not allow us to control for school quality. In Germany differences in school
quality arise primarily because of different school types, while the quality differences within
one school type are relatively small compared, for example, with the United States. There are
three types of secondary schools: Secondary general school („Hauptschule“), intermediate
school („Realschule“), and grammar school („Gymnasium“). There also is a distinction on the
academic level between universities and vocational schools („Fachhochschulen“) that are
more practically orientated than universities. One feature of the system is that the duration of
study is also an indicator of school quality (e.g. secondary general school takes only nine years
compared to 13 years in grammar school). Thus, the duration of education captures more than
just the quantity aspect.
Table 1 shows the controls used in the basic specification. Age and the birth cohort are not
separately identified in a cross-section. For this reason we use only one of them, namely the
birth cohort (COHORT). The sufficiently exogenous variables SINGLEPARENT and
SMALLKID*FEMALE are to capture the major reasons for people to work only part-time.
CIVILSERVANT mainly captures the different tax treatment of civil servants.
Family background variables are briefly described in table 2. We measure family background
in two different ways: We constructed variables similar to the DEGREE variable for the
parents’ years of education, and we also used dummies for parents’ college degree. These
variables appear to capture the influence of family background reasonably well. Including
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 It is important to note that returns to education measured from hourly wage data are smaller than those
from wages with a larger time frame, since hourly wages do not capture the effect of education on the time
worked.
10
other variables like the family size or the age difference between parents and children did not
change the results significantly and did not provide any further interesting insights.
Table 1: Controls used in the regressions.
EXPERIENCE General working experience in years, constructed from
biography data
TENURE Job tenure = number of years with the current employer
COHORT Birth cohort, deviation from sample mean
FEMALE Dummy variable, 1 if female
SINGLEPARENT Dummy variable, 1 if somebody is raising children without a
partner
SMALLKID*FEMALE Dummy variable, 1 if a woman has at least one child under age
16
CIVILSERVANT Dummy variable, 1 if civil servant
Other variables: Interaction terms of FEMALE and COHORT with DEGREE,
squares of EXPERIENCE and COHORT
Table 2: Family background variables used in part of the regressions.
MOTHERDEGREE,
FATHERDEGREE
Mother’s/father’s years of education, constructed in the same
way as DEGREE, deviations from sample mean
MOTHERCOLLEGE,
FATHERCOLLEGE
Dummy variable, 1 if mother/father has a college degree
PARENTSCOLLEGE Dummy variable, 1 if father or mother has a college degree *)
Other variables: Interaction terms of these variables with DEGREE
Notes: *) There are only very few cases in the sample where the mother has a college degree, but not the father.
3. Sample Characteristics
The working samples consist of 3,249 (full sample) and 495 persons (sibling sample). The
size of the sibling sample is reduced strongly compared to the full sample, since a fixed-
effects estimation requires at least pairs of observations with complete data. In the following
we describe the main characteristics of, and differences between, these two samples. The
descriptive statistics of the two samples including standard errors, minima, and maxima are
shown in table 3.
One major difference between the two samples is the age of the sample persons. By
construction, the sibling sample is much younger than the full sample, since the sibling
11
sample is made up of children of panel households. Average ages are 29 years and 37 years,
respectively. We observe only very few siblings above age 37. As a consequence of the
difference in age distributions, the sample distributions of other variables differ as well: While
the average durations of education are quite similar in the two samples (11.73 versus 11.41
years), mean experience (21.45 versus 14.33 years) and mean tenure (9.48 versus 5.74 years)
differ markedly.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the working samples.
Full Sample (#obs = 3249) Sibling Sample (#obs = 495)
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
wage 25.51 16.37 3 451 22.92 13.65 3 258
degree 11.73 2.69 8 20 11.41 2.50 8 20
experience 21.45 12.85 0 55 14.33 8.24 0 41
tenure 9.48 8.54 0 41 5.74 4.59 0 24
cohort 58.94 9.76 40 78 67.17 4.81 49 77
female 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1
motherdegree 8.68 2.41 0 18 8.75 1.67 0 18
fatherdegree 9.64 2.81 0 18 9.61 2.18 0 18
mothercollege 0.015 0.12 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1
fathercollege 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
parentscollege 0.075 0.26 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
The distributions of gross monthly income of both samples have a first peak at the social
security minimum threshold and a second peak at about 3,600 DM.9 The means of gross
monthly incomes are 4,234 DM in the full sample and 3,886 DM in the sibling sample. The
level of wages is roughly 9 percent lower in the sibling sample than in the full sample. This
can be attributed to the short labor market history of the persons in the sibling sample.
Family background variables are very similar in the two samples. In the full sample 1.5
percent of the mothers and 7 percent of the fathers have a college degree. Mothers’ and fathers’
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are still apprentices and thus receive a reduced salary during their training (12 percent of that sample). If one
excludes apprentices from both samples, the income distributions converge.
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average duration of education are 8.68 and 9.64 years, respectively. In the sibling sample 1
percent of the mothers and 6 percent of the fathers have a college degree. Mothers’ and fathers’
average years of education are 8.75 and 9.61 years.
V. Estimation Results
First, we discuss the results from the regressions using the full sample. These results show the
relevance of family background and the interesting interplay between level and slope effects.
Heterogeneity seems to be an important feature of returns to education. Second, we present
the results from the sibling sample, using the same specifications as in the full sample. These
sibling regressions are to be understood mainly as benchmarks for the results from the fixed-
effects estimation that provide further interesting insights. The marginal returns to education
are calculated from equation 7, using point estimates of the coefficients and the sample means
of all involved variables. Note that the reported returns are the ones for men. Since we
normalized all variables that are interacted with education (except for the dummy variables)
around their sample means, the returns can be read directly from the coefficients of education
and its square. The regression output is presented for selected regressions.
1. Results for the Full Sample
Table 4 gives an overview of the estimated returns from the main regressions in the full
sample. In table 5 we present the full regression results for our preferred specification
(including the parents’ college dummy and the corresponding interaction term).10
We first estimated a simple human capital earnings function similar to the standard Mincer
equation (see equation 1). Most coefficients are highly significant and all have the expected
sign. The estimated returns to education of 7.1 percent lie in the range of results reported in
the German literature. The returns for women are about one percentage point higher than the
ones for men.11
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Table 4: Marginal returns to education for different specifications in the full sample
Marginal Returns to Education
Mincer equation 7.1% (0.38%)
Including parents’ years of education 6.8% (0.64%)
Including parents’ college dummy 7.0% (0.48%)
Including parents’ years of education and the
corresponding interaction terms
6.6% (0.52%)
Including the parents’ college dummy and the
corresponding interaction term
4.1% if PARENTSCOLLEGE = 1 (1.04%)
6.6% if PARENTSCOLLEGE = 0 (0.48%)
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses.
Adding parents’ years of education as an additional regressor lowers the estimated returns to
education slightly to 6.8 percent. Father’s years of education appear to have a significant
positive effect on the level of wages while mother’s education is not significant. This is a
result often reported in the literature using US data. The college dummy
(PARENTSCOLLEGE) is not significant when added to the regression instead of parents’
years of education. It becomes highly significant, however, when it enters not only linearly,
but also as an interaction term with education (see table 5), and the null hypothesis that family
background does not matter is rejected at the one percent level. While the parents’ college
degree has a positive impact on the level of wages, it has a negative effect on the returns. This
result appears to be very robust and is consistent with the literature using US data (Ashenfelter
and Rouse, 1998). Adding interaction terms lowers returns quite a bit: Returns are 6.6 percent
if none of the parents has a college degree, but only 4.1 percent if at least one of the parents
has a college degree. In the context of the above outlined theoretical model the interplay
between returns and level might be interpreted as follows: Returns to education increase in
both the marginal benefit parameter bi and the marginal cost parameter ri (see equation 7).
Optimal schooling depends positively on the marginal benefit parameter bi, but negatively on
the marginal cost parameter ri (see equation 6). The fact that we observe a strong positive
correlation between parents’ and children’s education (see table 6), while returns are lower for
children from families with higher education, suggests that lower marginal costs are the main
reason for children from well-educated families attaining higher schooling in spite of lower
returns. This is a very interesting and surprising result. In the German education system there
are no tuition fees and rather generous support programs for children whose parents cannot
afford to give them financial backing during their studies. Thus, one might think that credit
14
market considerations play only a minor role in Germany. This means that taste factors and
psychic costs - that surely both depend on family background – might play a very important
role.12
Table 5: Regression results from the full sample including PARENTSCOLLEGE and its interaction term
with education.
Depend. variable logwage Coefficient Std. Error t-value P>|t|
degree 0.1055 0.0238 4.42 0.00
degree² -0.0017 0.0009 -1.87 0.06
experience 0.0244 0.0031 7.80 0.00
experience² -0.0003 0.0001 -4.37 0.00
tenure 0.0046 0.0011 4.19 0.00
cohort 0.0227 0.0035 6.46 0.00
cohort² -0.0003 0.0001 -2.80 0.01
female -0.2608 0.0701 -3.72 0.00
singleparent -0.0629 0.0301 -2.09 0.04
smallkids*fem -0.0515 0.0263 -1.96 0.05
civilservant -0.0990 0.0227 -4.36 0.00
parentscollege 0.4042 0.1367 2.96 0.00
cohort*degree -0.0018 0.0003 -5.71 0.00
female*degree 0.0098 0.0060 1.64 0.10
parentscollege*degree -0.0253 0.0093 -2.71 0.01
constant 1.8383 0.1582 11.62 0.00
Notes: Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Number of observations = 3249. R²  =  0.3290.
Table 6: Correlation between children’s and parents’ education in the full sample.
degree fatherdegree motherdegree
degree 1.00
fatherdegree 0.43 1.00
motherdegree 0.40 0.69 1.00
A similar interplay between linear terms and interaction terms can be observed for other
variables like the sex dummy and the birth cohort: Women and earlier cohorts have a lower
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level of wages, but a higher return. A Wald test confirms that heterogeneity of returns is
present: The null hypothesis of homogeneous returns is easily rejected. These results suggest
that a specification allowing for heterogeneous returns to education is indispensable for at
least two reasons: first, it gives us interesting insights into the “mechanism” of the
relationship between wage, education, and third factors; second, the omission of interaction
terms might lead to inconsistent estimates. When parents’ education is measured in years
instead of dummies, the effect disappears. Level and slope terms still have different signs, but
they are insignificant.
2. Results for the Sibling sample
Now we present the results for the sibling sample that comprises 495 siblings from 224
different families (183 pairs, 34 triples, and 7 quadruples). We first present the results for the
same specifications as in the full sample estimated by ordinary least squares. We do so in
order to check how the results depend on the specific sample. Then, we present the fixed-
effects estimates for the sibling sample.
Table 7 presents the regression results for the wage equation corresponding to table 5. In the
sibling sample the estimates of the returns to education are lower than in the full sample. The
coefficient of DEGREE is only 0.0319. The estimates of the marginal returns to education are
much lower than in the full sample. Since the variables that are interacted with DEGREE are
either centered around the sample mean or are dummies, the coefficient of DEGREE is readily
interpreted as the marginal return to education for a male person with average birth year and
parents without a college degree. The coefficient on PARENTSCOLLEGE*DEGREE is
negative but insignificant. Thus, the point estimate of the returns on education for persons
with college-educated parents are lower than for others, but not significantly different. This
contrasts to the findings in the full sample, where children of college-educated parents seemed
to have a significantly lower return to education. Similarly, the coefficient on
PARENTSCOLLEGE has the same sign as in the full sample - namely positive -, but is also
insignificant. The p-value for the test on joint significance of family background is 7 percent
and thus the null cannot be rejected.13 However, the hypothesis of homogeneous returns to
education is rejected with a p-value of 1.6 percent.
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As for the full sample, we also tried other specifications. The returns to education are lower
than in the full sample for all specifications of the wage function (see table 9). The result of
heterogeneous returns is very robust as indicated by a Wald-Test on the joint significance of
interaction terms.
Table 7: Wage regression for the sibling sample - OLS estimates.
Depend. variable logwage Coef. Std. Errors t P>|t|
degree 0.0319 0.0102 3.12 0.00
experience 0.0333 0.0081 4.09 0.00
experience² -0.0007 0.0002 -2.62 0.01
tenure 0.0139 0.0037 3.76 0.00
cohort 0.0465 0.0219 2.13 0.03
female -0.3127 0.1487 -2.10 0.04
singleparent -0.1581 0.0681 -2.32 0.02
smallkids*female -0.0544 0.0653 -0.83 0.41
civilservant -0.0857 0.1027 -0.84 0.40
parentscollege 0.6774 0.5108 1.33 0.19
cohort*degree -0.0039 0.0018 -2.13 0.03
female*degree 0.0176 0.0129 1.37 0.17
parentscollege*degree -0.0296 0.0296 -1.00 0.32
constant 2.3363 0.1537 15.20 0.00
Notes: Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Number of observations = 495, number of families = 224, R-squared = 0.2376.
Test on heterogeneous returns (H0: interactions are jointly zero) p-value = 0.016.
Test on family background (H0: all family variables are jointly zero) p-value = 0.07.
The results between the full and the sibling sample can differ for several reasons. First, the
sibling sample is much younger and thus experience and tenure differ, too. This may influence
the estimates of returns to education if returns to experience depend on schooling - for
instance it is very likely that the wage-experience profile is steeper for college graduates (see
for instance Fitzenberger et al. 1997 for age-earnings profiles for German males). Also, the
particular sample selection biases towards (i) persons with low education and (ii) towards
persons who have completed their degree relatively quickly.
Second, by construction, the sibling sample has a higher degree of „within“-correlation, since
it consists of siblings. Compared to the OLS-estimates in the full sample the within-variation
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in the sibling sample has more weight. This shifts the simple OLS-estimates towards the
within-estimates.
In the next step we estimated the wage equation using a fixed-effects estimator for an
unbalanced panel.14 Simply introducing family fixed effects „explains“ 41 percent of the total
variance in log-wages. Family background variables and other components of the individual-
specific variation that are linearly related to family characteristics are absorbed by the family
fixed effects. (As a matter of fact we cannot estimate the impact of those components in a
fixed-effects approach). Family fixed effects also absorb heterogeneity in returns which is
family specific. Only heterogeneity within the family is left. The results for the specification
that corresponds to tables 5 and 7 are reported in table 8.
Table 8: Fixed effects wage regression for sibling sample.
Depend. variable logwage Coefficients Std. Errors t-values P>|t|
degree 0.0168 0.0156 1.08 0.28
experience 0.0344 0.0100 3.44 0.00
experience² -0.0007 0.0003 -2.69 0.01
tenure 0.0141 0.0058 2.44 0.02
cohort 0.0732 0.0325 2.25 0.03
female -0.3814 0.2157 -1.77 0.08
singleparent -0.1891 0.1102 -1.72 0.09
smallkid*female -0.1226 0.0940 -1.31 0.19
civilservant 0.0131 0.1115 0.12 0.91
cohort*degree -0.0057 0.0027 -2.13 0.03
female*degree 0.0213 0.0184 1.16 0.25
parentscollege*degree -0.0079 0.0165 -0.48 0.63
constant 2.5482 0.2325 10.96 0.00
Number of persons = 495, number of families = 224.
Standard deviation of family effects = 0.281,  standard deviation of idiosyncratic effects = 0.335,
total standard deviation of unobserved effects = 0.438, R-square within = 0.181.
                                                
14
 A Hausman test on Random Effects is rejected. We do not display the Random Effects estimates here,
since they are of little interest given that they lie between OLS and Fixed Effects estimates.
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The fixed effects estimate for the linear education term is only 0.0168 and is insignificant.
Recall that the corresponding OLS estimate was 0.0319 in the siblings regression. In the full
sample the OLS estimate was 0.1055 for the linear and 0.0017 for the squared term of
education.. The total marginal return to schooling for our basic case (male, mean cohort,
parents without college) is 1.68 percent. For younger cohorts, the return is even lower. For
children of college educated parents the point estimate of marginal returns to education is
almost zero. Returns are still heterogeneous even if we control for family fixed effects
although the effect is less pronounced. The test on homogeneous returns rejects the null
hypothesis at a significance level of 7.4 percent.
In table 9 we display the point estimates for the marginal returns for different samples,
estimators, and specifications. The last two rows correspond to the estimates reported in tables
5, 7, and 8. The basic findings are that the returns to education may be considerably overstated
by OLS estimates of standard Mincer-type wage equations. Introducing family background
controls and interaction terms to control for heterogeneous returns reduces the estimates of
returns to education. Using the siblings subsample and fixed effects reduces the returns
further. For instance, the fixed effects estimate of the Mincer equation gives a marginal return
of only 2.4%, which is barely significantly different from zero. However, we have to keep in
mind the potential bias arising from measurement error.
Table 9: Comparison of marginal returns to education for different specifications.
Marginal Returns to Education
Full Sample
OLS
Sibling sample
OLS
Sibling sample
Fixed Effects
Mincer equation 7.1% (0.38%) 4.4% (0.83%) 2.4% (1.37%)
Including parents’ years of education 6.8% (0.64%) 3.5% (1.09%) –
Including parents’ college dummy 7.0% (0.48%) 3.9% (0.86%) –
Including parents’ years of education
and the corresponding interaction terms
6.6% (0.52%) 2.3% (1.08%) 3.1% (1.56%)
Including the parents’ college dummy
and the corresponding interaction term:
- PARENTSCOLLEGE = 1
- PARENTSCOLLEGE = 0
4.1% *) (1.04%)
6.6% (0.48%)
0.2% (2.85%)
3.2% (1.02%)
0.9% (1.95%)
1.7% (1.56%)
Notes: Standard Errors in Parantheses. *)  If we evaluate the marginal returns for the full sample at the means of
the sibling sample, the marginal returns are lower (2.64% and 5.17), but still well above the results for the
siblings regressions.
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VI. Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper we examined the role of family background in the determination of wages and its
impact on returns to education. The results from the full sample suggest that family
background in fact does play an important role in the determination of wages. Moreover, we
found that returns to education seem to be heterogeneous and influenced by family
background variables. Children of less educated parents have lower wages, but higher returns
to education with the correlation between children’s and parents’ schooling being positive.
According to the theoretical model this result might be due to higher marginal costs of
children in families with lower educational levels. Since credit market considerations play a
minor role in Germany, taste differences and psychic costs may play a major role.
The estimates from the full sample suffer, however, from the problem of endogeneity of
education. Thus, we have used a sibling analysis in order to reduce this bias. The results from
our analysis confirm the presumption that the OLS estimates might overstate the true returns
to education. On the other hand, measurement error might lead to a downward bias in the
estimates. Further research hopefully helps us to approximate the size of these effects. We
also found that household variation constitutes an important part of the variation in the
logarithm of wages, which confirms the important role of family characteristics.
There are some caveats and possible extensions to our analysis. One central point is the
neglect of the problem of measurement error in education and in family background variables.
The fixed-effect estimation might exacerbate this problem in reducing the signal-to-noise ratio
by „differencing“.
Second, so far we have not exploited the panel structure of the data. Even though the panel
does not help us to identify returns to education by differencing over time (since education
itself would be differenced out), we could use the longitudinal aspect of the data set in order
to increase efficiency or to generate additional identifying information, e.g. to solve the
problem of measurement error.
Third, other specifications could be tested that allow for a more flexible form. For example,
higher-order polynomials in education, experience, and tenure could be used as well as
interaction terms between education and age or experience. More importantly, we should try a
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correlated random-effects analysis in order to examine the assumptions underlying our fixed-
effects specification.
Another caveat concerns the adequacy of the siblings analysis for reducing the endogeneity
bias. We might worry that the siblings are not really comparable, because for example the first
child is treated differently than the second child. In fact, the first siblings’ wages are higher
than those of the second siblings. The same is true for education. Probably, most of this is due
to the difference in age between the first and the second sibling. It might, however, also be a
potential source of bias. As a first check, we included a dummy variable for being the first
sibling into our regressions. The coefficient of this dummy was not significantly different
from zero, which might indicate that there is no serious bias from this kind of problem. We
plan to examine this problem in more detail. A similar effect could be present in the
comparison of men and women. It might be good to use only sibling pairs of the same gender
to avoid such a problem. Of course, this would hugely reduce the sample size.
As a last point, we want to mention that our analysis allows us to control for individual
characteristics that are constant within families, but not for idiosyncratic ability factors. One
might want to include for example an IQ measure in order to capture at least part of these
factors. That kind of measure is not contained in the GSOEP, however. Moreover, it is
questionable what these IQ measures really indicate.
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